The fact that you can’t run any software you want in their hardware, and that you can’t install their software anywhere else than a Mac machine is part of the same idea. You need to buy the whole package if you want to be part of the group. In the old days (1940’s-50’s) programs were written to run on specific machines.

Initially, the two companies jointly developed the processors based on a design from ARM Holdings Plc, but Apple gradually took full control over development of the chip. About hardware, buying a modern Apple computer is almost a guarantee of having a great performing machine . But if you know a bit about hardware or take the time to investigate around, you can easily find very good choices too for a smaller price. Even though GNU/Linux isn’t as widely used as the other two OSs, I find Linux users are usually people interested in software and technology, and people who like to talk, learn, and share knowledge about it. At first, users had to pay if they wanted to buy a copy of Windows OS or upgrade their Windows version.

“This means that while Freeform might be a fairly useful bit of technology, it will remain largely niche for creatives, and possibly academics.” Apple doesn’t make new apps very often, so Freeform is exciting for that reason alone before you even get into its features. It’s also Apple’s first attempt at a real-time collaboration app, and in my limited testing, it seems to work great. But Apple’s problem is that there are already other freeform canvas-sharing tools, which are not only fuller-featured but don’t require Apple devices to use. The jury also found Apple liable for infringing one of Samsung’s patents and the South Korean corporation, which had initially sought US$6 million of damages, was awarded US$158,400. Apple filed papers on September 21 and 22, 2012 seeking a further amount of interest and damages totaling $707 million.

Because the time may be coming when the sprawling Microsoft empire will have to be busted up, like any other company that has spread itself too thin into too many product lines. And a deal-maker like Ballmer is just the type to lead that kind of massive corporate reorganization. The developer concluded that no young person would switch from AIM to MSN Messenger, which did not have the short-message feature. Anyone who wanted to tell friends what they were doing could write it on their profile page, he said. Meaning users would have to open the profile pages, one friend at a time, and search for a status message, if it was there at all.

Even Microsoft, it turned out, was not immune to the dot-com crash. The group working on the initiative was removed from a reporting line to Gates and folded into the major-product group dedicated to software for Office, the other mammoth Microsoft moneymaker besides Windows. Immediately, the technology can match this highspeed boxunloading named unit was reclassified from one charged with dreaming up and producing new ideas to one required to report profits and losses right away. It was August 1997, and Jeff Raikes—the executive responsible for Microsoft’s sales, marketing, and service initiatives—was urging him to buy shares.

In those years Microsoft had stepped up its efforts to cripple competitors, but—because of a series of astonishingly foolish management decisions—the competitors being crippled were often co-workers at Microsoft, instead of other companies. Staffers were rewarded not just for doing well but for making sure that their colleagues failed. As a result, the company was consumed by an endless series of internal knife fights. Potential market-busting businesses—such as e-book and smartphone technology—were killed, derailed, or delayed amid bickering and power plays. As a result, Microsoft was in big trouble, even if it remained insanely profitable. Ballmer had tripled revenues and doubled profits, but Microsoft’s stock price remained largely flat, a clear signal that investor perception was of a future not all that bright.

At that point, the company already had a mediocre search engine, called MSN Search, but it didn’t hold a candle to Google. So, Microsoft developed Windows Live Search, which also proved inferior. Following more revisions, with a few features discontinued, Microsoft announced its new platform, called Live Search. But by then the unit working on online search had become encrusted with Microsoft bureaucracy and the usual destructiveness that came along with it. By the fall of 2004, Microsoft faced a huge challenge from Google, because the smaller enterprise was snagging so many talented young software designers. Google was emerging as the new “It” company, with lots of cachet.